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Trigger happy?
The need for Parliament’s consent to trigger  
Art 50 is a matter of EU Law, says Richard Lang
P
aragraph 1 of Art 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union, governing voluntary 
withdrawal of a member state from 
the EU, reads: “Any member state 
may decide to withdraw from the Union 
in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements.” This right is followed in the 
next paragraph by an obligation: “A member 
state which decides to withdraw shall notify 
the European Council of its intention.” 
This contribution addresses a single 
hypothetical scenario, namely, one in which 
Theresa May triggers Art 50 without prior 
parliamentary approval, asking: If she did 
this, would she be acting illegally? Several 
legal commentators have now offered 
answers to this question, the majority in the 
affirmative, and last month a legal action 
began by which the claimants wish to enjoin 
May from so acting. Thus the judges will 
have the final say. But which judges?
Academic consensus
First things first. The academic consensus 
is that triggering Art 50 is the only legal 
way for the UK to withdraw from the EU. 
For the moment, the UK is still bound 
by her Treaty obligations. By the same 
logic, it follows that during the triggering 
process (which only involves sending a 
letter to the European Council, and will 
therefore be almost instantaneous), the 
UK will be bound by the doctrine of the 
primacy of EU law. Although developed 
by the Court of Justice through its case 
law, this doctrine is now enshrined in the 
Treaty, at Declaration 17.
Next, the possible grounds for challenging 
May’s act subdivide into two categories: the 
argument from UK Constitutional Law, and 
the argument from EU Law. This contribution 
concentrates on the second, which in any 
event cannibalises the first. From the point 
of view of EU Law, the claimants would 
presumably argue that, although May is 
the head of the government which is the 
international projection of the member state, 
she cannot claim that the UK has “decide[d] 
to withdraw” under Art 50(2) where said 
decision was not “in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements” under Art 50(1). 
“ Parliament has every right to rely 
on British judges  
to restrain 
government from 
cutting across her”
The precise ways in which the decision 
allegedly fell short of those requirements 
have been discussed at length by many 
learned jurists, including in this magazine 
Geoffrey Bindman QC (“Do we have to 
leave the EU?”, NLJ, 8 July 2016, p 6), and 
their work should be consulted for further 
elucidation. Particularly recommended 
are Barber, Hickman and King, “Pulling 
the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s 
Indispensable Role”, UK Const. L. Blog and 
contra, Armstrong, “Push Me, Pull You: 
Whose Hand on the Article 50 Trigger?” UK 
Const. L. Blog (both 27 Jun 2016, available 
at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/).
Interpretation issue
The issue is, though, that the interpretation 
of the phrase “constitutional requirements” 
from the Treaty would be the exclusive role 
of the Court of Justice. Although Art 50 has 
never been used before, let alone litigated 
upon, this phrase is used in over 10 other 
Articles, some of which have been the subject 
of judicial interpretation. An interesting case 
to consider would be Case C-145/04 Spain v 
UK, where the court refused to criticize the 
UK’s decision to grant EU voting rights to 
Commonwealth citizens residing in Gibraltar 
but not having citizenship of the Union. To say 
that this was a “light touch” appraisal of the 
domestic constitutional requirements at stake 
would be an understatement, more like “no 
touch”. This raises the prospect that whatever 
interpretation the member state concerned 
has already made of its own constitutional 
requirements will be nodded through, and 
the party challenging this interpretation will 
leave the court defeated and without further 
legal avenues to pursue, EU Law having 
primacy over domestic law.
It is to be expected that, on a reference from 
the UK court, the Court of Justice would once 
again take this path in any ex post challenge 
arising from a prerogative triggering of Art 50. 
An ex ante challenge, such as that currently 
before the courts, may have a first mover 
advantage, although that will still depend 
on the view taken by the Court of Justice 
both on the interpretation of “constitutional 
requirements” and on the issue of when the 
latter phrase should be interpreted: the Court 
does not like hypotheticals.
Exercising the law
Parliament has every right to rely on British 
judges to restrain government from cutting 
across her. But the judges must exercise 
the law as it stands on the day on which the 
reliance is placed. After the event, barring 
a possible but unlikely disagreement of 
the prime minister’s interpretation of UK 
constitutional law by the Court of Justice, 
primacy will force them to uphold May’s 
action. Before the event things may be 
different, but only if the Court of Justice hands 
sovereignty in interpreting the requirements 
to the national judges before it is too late. 
Either way, even where the issue under 
discussion is the UK’s exit from the EU, EU 
law (including legal interpretations by the 
Court of Justice) must take precedence over 
national law. Put another way, even as she 
attempts to remove the shackles of the 
doctrine of primacy, the UK cannot act as 
though they are already off.  NLJ
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